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Conscious “free will” is problematic because (1) brain mechanisms causing
consciousness are unknown, (2) measurable brain activity correlating with conscious
perception apparently occurs too late for real-time conscious response, consciousness
thus being considered “epiphenomenal illusion,” and (3) determinism, i.e., our actions
and the world around us seem algorithmic and inevitable. The Penrose–Hameroff theory
of “orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR)” identifies discrete conscious moments
with quantum computations in microtubules inside brain neurons, e.g., 40/s in concert
with gamma synchrony EEG. Microtubules organize neuronal interiors and regulate
synapses. In Orch OR, microtubule quantum computations occur in integration phases in
dendrites and cell bodies of integrate-and-fire brain neurons connected and synchronized
by gap junctions, allowing entanglement of microtubules among many neurons. Quantum
computations in entangled microtubules terminate by Penrose “objective reduction (OR),”
a proposal for quantum state reduction and conscious moments linked to fundamental
spacetime geometry. Each OR reduction selects microtubule states which can trigger
axonal firings, and control behavior. The quantum computations are “orchestrated” by
synaptic inputs and memory (thus “Orch OR”). If correct, Orch OR can account for
conscious causal agency, resolving problem 1. Regarding problem 2, Orch OR can cause
temporal non-locality, sending quantum information backward in classical time, enabling
conscious control of behavior. Three lines of evidence for brain backward time effects
are presented. Regarding problem 3, Penrose OR (and Orch OR) invokes non-computable
influences from information embedded in spacetime geometry, potentially avoiding
algorithmic determinism. In summary, Orch OR can account for real-time conscious causal
agency, avoiding the need for consciousness to be seen as epiphenomenal illusion. Orch
OR can rescue conscious free will.
Keywords: microtubules, free will, consciousness, Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR, volition, quantum computing, gap
junctions, gamma synchrony
INTRODUCTION: THREE PROBLEMS WITH FREE WILL
We have the sense of conscious control of our voluntary behav-
iors, of free will, of our mental processes exerting causal actions
in the physical world. But such control is difficult to scientifically
explain for three reasons:
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CAUSAL AGENCY
What is meant, exactly, by “we” (or “I”) exerting conscious
control? The scientific basis for consciousness, and “self,” are
unknown, and so a mechanism by which conscious agency may
act in the brain to exert causal effects in the world is also
unknown.
DOES CONSCIOUSNESS COME TOO LATE?
Brain electrical activity correlating with conscious perception of a
stimulus apparently can occur after we respond to that stimulus,
seemingly consciously. Accordingly, science and philosophy gen-
erally conclude that we act non-consciously, and have subsequent
false memories of conscious action, and thus cast conscious-
ness as epiphenomenal and illusory (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Wegner,
2002).
DETERMINISM
Even if consciousness and a mechanism by which it exerts real-
time causal action came to be understood, those specific actions
could be construed as entirely algorithmic and inevitably pre-
ordained by our deterministic surroundings, genetics and previ-
ous experience.
We do know that causal behavioral action and other cog-
nitive functions derive from brain neurons, and networks of
brain neurons, which integrate inputs to thresholds for outputs
as axonal firings, which then collectively control behavior. Such
actions may be either (seemingly, at least) conscious/voluntary,
or non-conscious (i.e., reflexive, involuntary, or “auto-pilot”).
The distinction between conscious and non-conscious activity
[the “neural correlate of consciousness (NCC)”] is unknown, but
often viewed as higher order emergence in computational net-
works of integrate-and-fire neurons in cortex and other brain
regions (Scott, 1995). Cortical-cortical, cortical-thalamic, brain-
stem and limbic networks of neurons connected by chemical
synapses are generally seen as neurocomputational frameworks
for conscious activity, (e.g., Baars, 1988; Crick and Koch, 1990;
Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001), with
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pre-frontal and pre-motor cortex considered to host executive
functions, planning and decision making.
But even if specific networks, neurons, membrane, and
synaptic activities involved in consciousness were completely
known, questions would remain. Aside from seemingly occur-
ring too late for conscious control, neurocomputational activity
fails to: (1) distinguish between conscious and non-conscious
(“auto-pilot”) cognition, (2) account for long-range gamma
synchrony electro-encephalography (“EEG”), the best measur-
able NCC (Singer and Gray, 1995), for which gap junction
electrical synapses are required, (3) account for “binding” of
disparate activities into unified percepts, (4) consider scale-
invariant (“fractal-like,” “1/f”) brain dynamics and structure,
and (5) explain the “hard problem” of subjective experience
(e.g., Chalmers, 1996). A modified type of neuronal network can
resolve some of these issues, but to fully address consciousness
and free will, something else is needed. Here I propose themissing
ingredient is finer scale, deeper order, molecular-level quantum
effects in cytoskeletal microtubules inside brain neurons.
In particular, the Penrose–Hameroff “Orch OR” model sug-
gests that quantum computations in microtubules inside brain
neurons process information and regulate membrane and synap-
tic activities. Microtubules are lattice polymers of subunit
proteins called “tubulin.” Orch OR proposes tubulin states in
microtubules act as interactive information “bits,” and also as
quantum superpositions of multiple possible tubulin states (e.g.,
quantum bits or qubits). During integration phases, tubulin
qubits interact by entanglement, evolve and compute by the
Schrödinger equation, and then reduce, or collapse to definite
states, e.g., after 25ms in gamma synchrony. The quantum state
reduction is due to an objective threshold [“objective reduction
(OR)”] proposed by Penrose, accompanied by a moment of con-
scious awareness. Synaptic inputs and other factors “orchestrate”
the microtubule quantum computations, hence “orchestrated
objective reduction (Orch OR).”
Orch OR directly addresses conscious causal agency. Each
reduction/conscious moment selects particular microtubule
states which regulate neuronal firings, and thus control conscious
behavior. Regarding consciousness occurring “too late,” quantum
state reductions seem to involve temporal non-locality, able to
refer quantum information both forward and backward in what
we perceive as time, enabling real-time conscious causal action.
Quantum brain biology and Orch OR can thus rescue free will.
CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN, AND CAUSALITY
Consciousness involves awareness, phenomenal experience (com-
posed of what philosophers term “qualia”), sense of self, feelings,
apparent choice and control of actions, memory, a model of
the world, thought, language, and, e.g., when we close our eyes,
or meditate, internally-generated images and geometric patterns.
But what consciousness actually is remains unknown.
Most scientists and philosophers view consciousness as an
emergent property of complex computation among networks
of the brain’s 100 billion “integrate-and-fire” neurons. In digi-
tal computers, discrete voltage levels represent information units
(e.g., “bits”) in silicon logic gates. McCulloch and Pitts (1943)
arranged logic gates as integrate-and-fire silicon neurons, leading
to “perceptrons” (Rosenblatt, 1962; Figure 1) and self-organizing
“artificial neural networks” capable of learning and self-organized
behavior. Similarly, according to the standard “Hodgkin and
Huxley” (1952) model, biological neurons are “integrate-and-
fire” threshold logic device in which multiple branched dendrites
and a cell body (soma) receive and integrate synaptic inputs
as membrane potentials. The integrated potential is then com-
pared to a threshold potential at the axon hillock, or axon
initiation segment (AIS). When AIS threshold is reached by
the integrated potential, an all-or-none action potential “fir-
ing,” or “spike” is triggered as output, conveyed along the
axon to the next synapse. Axonal firings can manifest will and
behavior, e.g., causing other neurons to move muscles or speak
words.
Some contend that consciousness emerges from axonal firing
outputs, “volleys,” or “explosions” from complex neurocompu-
tation (Koch, 2004; Malach, 2007). But coherent axonal firings
are preceded and caused by synchronized dendritic/somatic inte-
grations, suggesting consciousness involves neuronal dendrites
and cell bodies/soma, i.e., in integration phases of “integrate-
and-fire” sequences (Pribram, 1991; Eccles, 1992; Woolf and
Hameroff, 2001; Tononi, 2004). Integration implies merging
and consolidation of multiple input sources to one output,
FIGURE 1 | Three characterizations of integrate-and-fire neurons. Top:
Biological neuron with multiple dendrites and one cell body (soma) receive
and integrate synaptic inputs as membrane potentials which are compared
to a threshold at the axon initiation segment (AIS). If threshold is met,
axonal spikes/firings are triggered along a single axon which branches
distally to convey outputs. Middle: computer-based artificial neuron (e.g., a
“perceptron,” Rosenblatt, 1962) with multiple weighted inputs and single
branched output. Bottom:model neuron (see subsequent figures) showing
the same essential features with three inputs on one dendrite and single
axonal output which branches distally.
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e.g., chemical synaptic inputs integrated toward threshold for
firing, commonly approximated as linear summation of den-
dritic/somatic membrane potentials. However actual integration
is active, not passive, and involves complex logic and signal
processing in dendritic spines, branch points and local regions,
amplification of distal inputs, and changing firing threshold at the
AIS trigger zone (Shepherd, 1996; Sourdet and Debanne, 1999;
Poirazi and Mel, 2001). Dendrites and soma are primary sources
of EEG, and sites of anesthetic action which erase consciousness
with little or no effects on axonal firing capabilities. Arguably,
dendritic/somatic integration is closely related to consciousness,
with axonal firings the outputs of conscious (or non-conscious)
processes. Nonetheless, according to the Hodgkin–Huxley model,
integration is assumed to be completely algorithmic and deter-
ministic (Figure 2A), leaving no apparent room for conscious
free will.
However, Naundorf et al. (2006) showed that firing thresh-
old in cortical neurons in brains of awake animals (compared
to neurons in slice preparations) varies widely on a spike-to-
spike, firing-to-firing basis. Some factor other than the integrated
AIS membrane potential contributes to firing, or not firing
(Figure 2B). Firings control behavior. This “x-factor,” modulating
integration and adjusting firing threshold and timing, is perfectly
positioned for causal action, for conscious free will. Whatmight it
involve? Figure 2B indicates possible modification of integration
and firing threshold by backward time referral.
Anatomically, a source for integration and firing threshold
modification comes from lateral connections among neurons
via gap junctions, or electrical synapses (Figure 3). Gap junc-
tions are membrane protein complexes in adjacent neurons
(or glia) which fuse the two cells and synchronize their membrane
polarization states e.g., in gamma synchrony EEG (Dermietzel,
1998; Draguhn et al., 1998; Galarreta and Hestrin, 1999; Bennett
and Zukin, 2004; Fukuda, 2007), the best measurable NCC (Gray
and Singer, 1989; Fries et al., 2002; Kokarovtseva et al., 2009).
Gap junction-connected cells also have continuous intracellu-
lar spaces, as open gap junctions between cells act like win-
dows, or doors between adjacent rooms. Neurons connected by
dendritic-dendritic gap junctions have synchronized local field
potentials (EEG) in integration phase, but not necessarily syn-
chronous axonal firing outputs. Thus gap junction synchronized
dendritic networks can collectively integrate inputs, and provide
FIGURE 3 | (A) Dendrites of adjacent neurons linked by gap junction which
remain closed. The gap junction connection is “sideways,” lateral to the
flow of synaptic information. (B) Dendritic-dendritic gap junction open,
synchronizing (vertical stripes) electrophysiology and enabling collective
integration among gap junction-connected neurons.
FIGURE 2 | Integrate-and-fire neuronal behaviors. (A) The
Hodgkin–Huxley model predicts integration by membrane potential in
dendrites and soma reach a specific, narrow threshold potential at the
proximal axon (AIS), and fire with very low temporal variability (small tb–ta)
for given inputs. (B) Recordings from cortical neurons in awake animals
(Naundorf et al., 2006) show a large variability in effective firing threshold
and timing. Some unknown “x-factor” (related to consciousness?) exerts
causal influence on firing and behavior. Here, quantum temporal non-locality
results in backward time referral, suggested as the “x-factor” modulating
firing threshold.
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an x-factor in selectively controlling firing outputs (Hameroff,
2010). Gap junction dynamics may also enable mobile agency
in the brain. As gap junctions open and close, synchronized
zones of collective integration and conscious causal agency can
literally move through the brain, modulating integration, firing
thresholds and behavior (Figure 4; Hameroff, 2010; Ebner and
Hameroff, 2011). As consciousness can occur in different brain
locations at different times, the NCCmay be a mobile zone exert-
ing conscious causal agency in various brain regions at different
times.
But why would such causal agency be conscious? And with
membranes synchronized, how do gap junction-connected neu-
rons share and integrate information? Evidence points to the
origins of behavior and consciousness at a deeper order, finer scale
within neurons, e.g., in cytoskeletal structures such as micro-
tubules which organize cell interiors.
A FINER SCALE?
Single cell organisms like Paramecium swim about, avoid obsta-
cles and predators, find food and mates, and have sex, all without
any synaptic connections. They utilize cytoskeletal structures such
as microtubules (in protruding cilia and within their internal
cytoplasm) for sensing and movement. The single cell slime mold
Physarum polycephalum sends out numerous tendrils composed
of bundles of microtubules, forming patterns which, seeking
food, can solve problems and escape a maze (e.g., Adamatzky,
2012). Observing the purposeful behavior of single cell crea-
tures, neuroscientist Charles Sherrington (1957) remarked: “of
nerve there is no trace, but perhaps the cytoskeleton might
serve.”
Interiors of animal cells are organized by the cytoskeleton, a
scaffolding-like protein network of microtubules, microtubule-
associated proteins (MAPs), actin and intermediate filaments
(Figure 5A). Microtubules are cylindrical polymers 25 nm
(nm = 10−9 m) in diameter, composed usually of 13 longitudi-
nal protofilaments, each a chain of the peanut-shaped protein
tubulin (Figure 5B). Microtubules self-assemble from tubulin, a
ferroelectric dipole arranged within microtubules in two types of
hexagonal lattices (A-lattice and B-lattice; Tuszynski et al., 1995),
each slightly twisted, resulting in differing neighbor relationships
among each subunit and its six nearest neighbors. Pathways along
contiguous tubulins in the A-lattice form helical pathways which
repeat every 3, 5, and 8 rows on any protofilament (the Fibonacci
series; Figure 5B).
Each tubulin may differ from among its neighbors by genetic
variability, post-translational modifications, binding of ligands
and MAPs, and moment to moment dipole state transitions.
Thus microtubules have enormous capacity for complex infor-
mation representation and processing, are particularly prevalent
in neurons (109 tubulins/neuron), and uniquely stable and con-
figured in dendrites and cell bodies (Craddock et al., 2012a).
Microtubules in axons (and non-neuronal cells) are arrayed radi-
ally, extending continuously (all with the same polarity) from
the centrosome near the nucleus, outward toward the cell mem-
brane. However microtubules in dendrites and cell bodies are
interrupted, of mixed polarity, stabilized, and arranged in local
recursive networks suitable for learning and information process-
ing (Figure 5A; Rasmussen et al., 1990).
Neuronal microtubules regulate synapses in several ways.
They serve as tracks and guides for motor proteins (dynein
and kinesin) which transport synaptic precursors from cell
body to distal synapses, encountering, and choosing among
several dendritic branch points and many microtubules. The
guidance mechanism for such delivery, choosing the proper
path, is unknown, but seems to involve the MAP tau as a
traffic signal (placement of tau at specific sites on microtubules
being the critical feature). In Alzheimer’s disease, tau is hyper-
phosphorylated and dislodged from destabilized microtubules.
FIGURE 4 | Two timesteps in a neurocomputational network of
integrate-and-fire neurons. Inputs come from left, outputs go to top,
bottom and right. Dendritic-dendritic gap junctions may open, e.g., between
striped dendrites and soma to form “synchronized webs.” As gap junctions
open and close, the synchronized web can move through the network,
e.g., Step 1, 2. Mobile webs are candidates for the neural correlates of
consciousness (NCC). Outputs marked by ∗ reflect collective integration and
suggest conscious causal agency.
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Axon terminal (left) with two internal microtubules releasing
neurotransmitters into synapse and onto receptors in membrane of dendritic
spine. Actin filaments (as well as soluble second messengers, not
shown) connect to cytoskeletal microtubules in main dendrite. Dendritic
microtubules (right) are arranged in local networks, interconnected by
microtubule-associated proteins (MAPs). (B) Larger scale showing two types of
microtubule information processing. Top row: four timesteps in a microtubule
automata simulation, each tubulin holding a bit state, switching e.g., at 10
megahertz (Rasmussen et al., 1990; Sahu et al., 2012). Bottom row: four
topological bits in a microtubule. Information represented as specific helical
pathways of conductance and information transfer. Microtubule mechanical
resonances come into play (Hameroff et al., 2002; Sahu et al., 2012).
Disruption of microtubules and formation of neurofibrillary
tangles composed of free, hyperphosphorylated tau correlates
with memory loss in Alzheimer’s disease (Matsuyama and Jarvik,
1989; Craddock et al., 2012b), and post-anesthetic cognitive dys-
function (Craddock et al., 2012c).
Due to their lattice structure and direct involvement in orga-
nizing cellular functions, microtubules have been suggested to
function as information processing devices. After Sherrington’s
(1957) broad observation about cytoskeletal information process-
ing, Atema (1973) proposed that tubulin conformational changes
propagate as signals along microtubules. Hameroff and Watt
(1982) suggested that microtubule lattices act as two-dimensional
Boolean computational switching matrices with input/output
occurring viaMAPs.Microtubule information processing has also
been viewed in the context of cellular (“molecular”) automata
in which tubulin states interact with hexagonal lattice neighbor
tubulin states by dipole couplings, synchronized by biomolecu-
lar coherence as proposed by Fröhlich (1968, 1970, 1975); (Smith
et al., 1984; Rasmussen et al., 1990). Simulations of microtubule
automata based on tubulin states show rapid information inte-
gration and learning. Recent evidence indicates microtubules
have resonances at frequency ranges from 10 kHz to 10MHz,
and possibly higher (Sahu et al., 2012). Topological computing
can also occur in which helical pathways through the skewed
hexagonal lattice are the relevant states, or bits (Figure 2B, bot-
tom). Particular resonance frequencies may correlate with specific
helical pathways.
With roughly 109 tubulins per neuron switching at e.g.,
10MHz (107), the potential capacity for microtubule-based
information processing is 1016 operations/s per neuron. Integr-
ation in microtubules (influenced by encoded memory), and syn-
chronized in collective integration by gap junctions may be an
x-factor in altering firing threshold and exerting causal agency
in sets of synchronized neurons. But even a deeper order, finer
scale microtubule-based process in a self-organizing zone of con-
scious agency would still be algorithmic and deterministic, and
fail to address completely the problems of consciousness and
free will.
And another problem looms.
IS CONSCIOUSNESS TOO LATE?
Several lines of evidence suggest that real time conscious action
is an illusion, that we act non-consciously and have belated, false
impressions of conscious causal action. This implies that free will
does not exist, that consciousness is epiphenomenal, and that we
are, as Huxley (1893/1986) bleakly summarized, “merely helpless
spectators.” Apparent evidence against real-time conscious action
includes the following:
SENSORY CONSCIOUSNESS COMES TOO LATE FOR CONSCIOUS
RESPONSE
Neural correlates of conscious perception occur 150–500ms after
impingement on our sense organs, apparently too late for causal
efficacy in seemingly conscious perceptions and willful actions,
often initiated or completed within 100ms after sensory impinge-
ment. Velmans (1991, 2000) listed a number of examples: analysis
of sensory inputs and their emotional content, phonological,
and semantic analysis of heard speech and preparation of one’s
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own spoken words and sentences, learning and formation of
memories, and choice, planning and execution of voluntary
acts. Consequently, the subjective feeling of conscious control
of these behaviors is deemed illusory (Dennett, 1991; Wegner,
2002).
In speech, evoked potentials (EPs) indicating conscious word
recognition occur about 400ms after auditory input, however
semantic meaning is appreciated (and response initiated) after
only 200ms. As Velmans points out, only two phonemes are
heard by 200ms, and an average of 87 words share their first two
phonemes. Even when contextual effects are considered, seman-
tic processing and initiation of response occur before conscious
recognition (Van Petten et al., 1999).
Gray (2004) observes that in tennis “The speed of the ball
after a serve is so great, and the distance over which it has to
travel so short, that the player who receives the serve must strike
it back before he has had time consciously to see the ball leave
the server’s racket. Conscious awareness comes too late to affect
his stroke.” McCrone (1999): “[for] tennis players . . . facing a fast
serve . . . even if awareness were actually instant, it would still not
be fast enough . . . .” Nonetheless tennis players claim to see the
ball consciously before they attempt to return it.
READINESS POTENTIALS
Kornhuber and Deecke (1965) recorded brain electrical activity
over pre-motor cortex in subjects who were asked to move their
finger randomly, at no prescribed time. They found that brain
electrical activity preceded finger movement by ∼800ms, call-
ing this activity the readiness potential (“RP,” Figure 6A). Libet
and colleagues (1983) repeated the experiment, except they also
asked subjects to note precisely when they consciously decided to
move their finger. (To do so, and to avoid delays caused by verbal
report, Libet et al. used a rapidly moving clock and asked subjects
to note when on the clock they consciously decided to move their
finger). This conscious decision came ∼200ms before actual fin-
ger movement, hundreds of milliseconds after onset of the RP.
Libet and many authorities concluded that the RP represented
non-conscious determination of movement, that many seemingly
conscious actions are actually initiated by nonconscious pro-
cesses, and that conscious intent was an illusion. Consciousness
apparently comes too late. However, as shown in Figure 6B, tem-
poral non-locality enabling backward time referral of (quantum)
information from the moment of conscious intent can account
for necessary RP preparation.
And yet we feel as though we act consciously in real time.
To account for this paradox, Dennett (1991); (cf. Dennett and
Kinsbourne, 1992) described real time conscious perception and
action as retrospective construction, as illusion. His multiple
drafts model proposed sensory inputs and cognitive processing
produced tentative contents under continual revision, with the
definitive, final edition only inserted into memory, overriding
previous drafts (“Orwellian Revisionism” after George Orwell’s
fictional, retroactive “Ministry of Truth” in the novel 1984).
Perceptions are edited and revised over hundreds of milliseconds,
a final version inserted into memory. In this view (more or less
the standard in modern philosophy and neuroscience) the brain
retrospectively creates content or judgment, e.g., of real time con-
scious control which is recorded in memory as veridical truth. In
other words, we act non-consciously in real time, but then falsely
remember acting consciously. Consciousness, in this view, is an
epiphenomenal illusion occurring after-the-fact. We are living in
the past.
For example in the “color phi” effect (Kolers and von Grunau,
1976) a red spot appears briefly on the left side of a screen,
FIGURE 6 | The “readiness potential (RP)” (Libet et al., 1983).
(A) Cortical potentials recorded from a subject instructed to move his/her
hand whenever he/she feels ready, and to note when the decision was
made (Conscious intent), followed quickly by the finger actually moving.
(Time between Conscious intent, and finger moving is fixed.) Readiness
potential, RP, preceding Conscious intent is generally interpreted as
representing the Non-conscious choice to move the finger, with
Conscious intent being illusion. (B) Assuming RP is necessary
preparation for conscious finger movement, Actual conscious intent could
initiate the earlier RP by (quantum) temporal non-locality and backward
time referral, enabling preparation while preserving real time conscious
intent and control.
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followed after a pause by a green spot on the right side. Conscious
observers report one spot moving back and forth, changing to
green halfway across the screen, the brain seemingly “filling in”
(Figure 7). Yet after a sequence of such observations, if the spot
on the right is suddenly red (instead of green), the subject is not
fooled and fills in continuously with red halfway across. Does the
brain know in advance to which color the dot will change? No, says
Dennett. The brain fills in the proper color in a subsequent draft,
and belatedly imprints it into conscious memory. Consciousness
occurs after the fact (Figure 7A). Any conscious response to the
color change would occur well after presentation, dooming free
will. However a quantum explanation with temporal non-locality
and backward time referral enables constructive “filling in” from
near future brain activity, allowing real time conscious perception
(Figure 7B). Is there any evidence for backward time effects in
the brain?
BACKWARD TIME EFFECTS IN THE BRAIN? THREE LINES
OF EVIDENCE
LIBET’S “OPEN BRAIN” SENSORY EXPERIMENTS
In addition to volitional studies (moving a finger), Libet and
colleagues studied the timing of conscious sensory experience
in awake, cooperative patients undergoing brain surgery with
local anesthesia (e.g., Libet et al., 1964, 1979; Libet, 2004). With
his neurosurgical colleagues, in these patients Libet was able to
record from, and stimulate specific areas of somatosensory cor-
tex, e.g., corresponding to the skin of each patient’s hand, and the
hand itself (Figures 8 and 9), as well as communicate with the
conscious patients.
As depicted in Figure 8A, peripheral stimulus, e.g., of the skin
of the hand, resulted in an “EP” spike in the somatosensory
cortical area for the hand ∼30ms after skin contact, consis-
tent with the time required for a neuronal signal to travel from
hand to spinal cord, thalamus, and brain. The stimulus also
caused several 100ms of ongoing cortical activity following the
EP. Subjects reported conscious experience of the stimulus (using
Libet’s rapidly moving clock) near-immediately, e.g., at the time
of the EP at 30ms.
Libet also stimulated the “hand area” of subjects’ brain
somatosensory cortex directly (Figure 8B). This type of stim-
ulation did not cause an EP spike, but did result in ongoing
brain electrical activity. Conscious sensation referred to (“felt in”)
the hand occurred, but only after stimulation and ongoing
brain activity lasting up to 500ms (Figure 8B). This require-
ment of ongoing, prolonged electrical activity (what Libet termed
“neuronal adequacy”) to produce conscious experience (“Libet’s
500ms”) was subsequently confirmed by Amassian et al. (1991),
Ray et al. (1999), Pollen (2004) and others.
But if hundreds of milliseconds of brain activity are required
for neuronal adequacy, how can conscious sensory experience
occur at 30ms? To address this issue, Libet also performed exper-
iments in which stimulation of thalamus resulted in an EP at
30ms, but only brief ongoing activity, i.e., without neuronal
adequacy (Figure 9A). No conscious experience occurred. Libet
concluded that for real-time conscious perception (e.g., at the
30ms EP), two factors were necessary: an EP at 30ms, and sev-
eral 100ms of ongoing cortical activity (neuronal adequacy) after
the EP. Somehow, apparently, the brain seems to know what will
happen after the EP. Libet concluded the hundreds of millisec-
onds of ongoing cortical activity (“neuronal adequacy”) is the
sine qua non for conscious experience—the NCC, even if it occurs
after the conscious experience. To account for his results, he fur-
ther concluded that subjective information is referred backwards
in time from the time of neuronal adequacy to the time of the
EP (Figure 9B). Libet’s backward time assertion was disbelieved
and ridiculed (e.g., Churchland, 1981; Pockett, 2002), but never
refuted (Libet, 2002, 2003).
PRE-SENTIMENT AND PRE-COGNITION
Electrodermal activity measures skin impedance, usually with
a probe wrapped around a finger, as an index of autonomic,
sympathetic neuronal activity causing changes in blood flow
FIGURE 7 | In the “color phi” phenomenon (Kolers and von Grunau,
1976). A red circle appears on the left side of a screen, disappears, and then,
a fraction of a second later, a green circle appears on the right side. An
observer consciously “sees” a red circle moving continuously from left to
right, changing to green halfway across. (A) According to Dennett’s
“Orwellian Revisionism,” the brain constructs, or fills in the movement and
transition after the fact, and inserts a constructed perception into memory.
Real-time perception is not conscious. (B) In a “Quantum Explanation,”
temporal non-locality and backward time referral allow real-time, veridical
conscious perception.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 93 | 7
Hameroff Temporal non-locality and real-time causal agency
FIGURE 8 | Cortical potentials in Libet’s sensory experiments.
(A) Peripheral stimulation, e.g., at the hand, results in near-immediate
conscious experience of the stimulation, an evoked potential EP at
∼30ms in the “hand area” of somatosensory cortex, and several
100ms of ongoing cortical electrical activity. (B) Direct cortical
activity of the somatosensory cortical hand area for several 100ms
results in no EP, ongoing cortical activity, and conscious sensory
experience of the hand, but only after ∼500ms. Libet termed the
500ms of cortical activity resulting in conscious experience “neuronal
adequacy.”
FIGURE 9 | Libet’s sensory experiments, continued. (A) Libet et al.
stimulated medial lemniscus of thalamus in the sensory pathway to
produce an EP (∼30ms) in somatosensory cortex, but only brief
post-EP stimulation, resulting in only brief cortical activity. There was
no apparent “neuronal adequacy,” and no conscious experience. An EP
and several 100ms of post-EP cortical activity (neuronal adequacy)
were required for conscious experience at the time of EP. (B) To
account for his findings, Libet concluded that subjective information
was referred backward in time from neuronal adequacy (∼500ms) to
the EP.
and sweating, in turn triggered by emotional response in the
brain. Over many years, researchers (Bierman and Radin, 1997;
Bierman and Scholte, 2002; Radin, 2004) have published a
number of well-controlled studies using electrodermal activity,
fMRI and other methods to look for emotional responses, e.g.,
to viewing images presented at random times on a computer
screen. They found, not surprisingly, that highly emotional (e.g.,
violent, sexual) images elicited greater responses than neutral,
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non-emotional images. But surprisingly, the changes occurred
half a second to two seconds before the images appeared. They
termed the effect pre-sentiment because the subjects were not
consciously aware of the emotional feelings. Non-conscious emo-
tional sentiment (i.e., feelings) appeared to be referred backward
in time. These studies were published in the parapsychology lit-
erature, as mainstream academic journals refused to consider
them.
Bem (2012) published “Feeling the future: experimental evi-
dence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and
affect” in the mainstream J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. The article reported
on eight studies showing statistically significant backward time
effects, most involving non-conscious influence of future emo-
tional effects (e.g., erotic or threatening stimuli) on cognitive
choices. Studies by others have reported both replication, and
failure to replicate, the controversial results.
QUANTUM DELAYED CHOICE EXPERIMENTS
In the famous “double slit experiment,” quantum entities (e.g.,
photons, electrons) can behave as either waves, or particles,
depending on the method chosen to measure them. Wheeler
(1978) described a thought experiment in which the measure-
ment choice (by a conscious human observer) was delayed until
after the electron or other quantum entity passed though the
slits, presumably as either wave or particle. Wheeler suggested the
observer’s delayed choice could retroactively influence the behav-
ior of the electrons, e.g., as waves or particles. The experiment was
eventually performed (Kim et al., 2000) and confirmed Wheeler’s
prediction; conscious choices can affect previous events, as long
as the events had not been consciously observed in the interim.
In “delayed choice entanglement swapping,” originally a
thought experiment proposed by Asher Peres (2000); Ma et al.
(2012) went a step further. Entanglement is a characteristic fea-
ture of quantum mechanics in which unified quantum particles
are separated but remain somehow connected, even over dis-
tance. Measurement or perturbation of one separated-but-still-
entangled particle instantaneously affects the other, what Einstein
referred to (mockingly) as “spooky action at a distance.” Despite
its bizarre nature, entanglement has been demonstrated repeat-
edly, and is the foundation for quantum cryptography, quantum
teleportation and quantum computing (Deutsch, 1985). In entan-
glement swapping, two pairs of unified/entangled particles are
separated, and one from each pair is sent to two measurement
devices, each associated with a conscious observer (“Alice” and
“Bob,” as is the convention in such quantum experiments). The
other entangled particle from each pair is sent to a third observer,
“Victor.” How Victor decides to measure the two particles (as
an entangled pair, or as separable particles) determines whether
Alice and Bob observe them as entangled (showing quantum
correlations) or separable (showing classical correlations). This
happens even if Victor decides after Alice’s and Bob’s devices have
measured them (but before Alice and Bob consciously view the
results). Thus, conscious choice affects behavior of previously
measured, but unobserved, events.
How can backward time effects be explained scientifically? The
problem may be related to our perception of time in classical
(non-quantum) physics. Anton Zeilinger, senior author on the
Ma et al. study, said: “Within a naïve classical worldview, quan-
tum mechanics can even mimic an influence of future actions on
past events.”
TIME AND CONSCIOUS MOMENTS
What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked
him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked
him, he did not. The (“naïve”) worldview according to classical
Newtonian physics is that time is either a process which flows,
or a dimension in 4-dimensional space-time along which pro-
cesses occur. But if time flows, it would do so in some medium
or dimension (e.g., minutes per what?). If time is a dimension,
why would processes occur unidirectionally in time? Yet we con-
sciously perceive a unidirectional time-like reality. An alternative
explanation is that time does not exist as process or dimension,
but as a collage of discrete configurations of the universe, con-
nected in some way by consciousness and memory (Barbour,
1999). This follows Leibniz “monads” (e.g., Rescher, 1991; c.f.
Spinoza, 1677), momentary, snapshot-like arrangements of spa-
tiotemporal reality based on Mach’s principle that the universe
has an underlying structure related to mass distribution (also
a foundation of Einstein’s general relativity). Whitehead (1929,
1933) expounded on Leibniz monads, conferring mental aspects
to occasions occurring in a wider field of “proto-conscious expe-
rience” (“occasions of experience”). These views from philosophy
and physics link consciousness to discrete events in the fine
structure of physical reality.
Consciousness has also been seen as discrete events in psy-
chology, e.g., James, (1890) “specious present, the short duration
of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible” (though
James was vague about duration, and also described a contin-
ual “stream of consciousness”). The “perceptual moment” theory
of Stroud (1956) described consciousness as a series of dis-
crete events, like sequential frames of a movie [modern film and
video present 24–72 frames/s, 24–72 cycles/s, i.e., Hertz (“Hz”)].
Periodicities for perception and reaction times are in the range
of 20–50ms, i.e., gamma synchrony EEG (30–90Hz). Slower
periods, e.g., 4–7Hz theta frequency, with nested gamma waves
may correspond with saccades and visual gestalts (Woolf and
Hameroff, 2001; Van Rullen and Koch, 2003).
Support for consciousness as sequences of discrete events
is also found in Buddhism, trained meditators describing dis-
tinct “flickerings” in their experience of pure undifferentiated
awareness (Tart, 1995, pers. communication). Buddhist texts
portray consciousness as “momentary collections of mental
phenomena,” and as “distinct, unconnected and impermanent
moments which perish as soon as they arise.” Buddhist writings
even quantify the frequency of conscious moments. For exam-
ple the Sarvaastivaadins (von Rospatt, 1995) described 6,480,000
“moments” in 24 h (an average of one “moment” per 13.3ms,
75Hz), and some Chinese Buddhism as one “thought” per 20ms
(50Hz), both in gamma synchrony range.
Long-range gamma synchrony in the brain is the best mea-
surable NCC. In surgical patients undergoing general anesthe-
sia, gamma synchrony between frontal and posterior cortex
is the specific marker which disappears with loss of con-
sciousness and returns upon awakening (John and Prichep, 2005;
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Hameroff, 2006). In what may be considered enhanced or opti-
mized levels of consciousness, high frequency (more than 80Hz)
phase coherent gamma synchrony was found spanning cortical
regions in meditating Tibetan monks, at the highest ampli-
tude ever recorded (Lutz et al., 2004). Faster rates of conscious
moments may correlate with subjective perception of slower time
flow, e.g., as in a car accident, or altered state. But what are con-
scious moments? Shimony (1993) recognized that Whitehead’s
occasions were compatible with quantum state reductions, or
“collapses of the wave function.” Several lines of evidence sug-
gest consciousness could be identified with sequences of quantum
state reductions. What exactly are quantum state reductions?
CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUANTUM STATE REDUCTION
Reality is described by quantum physical laws which appear to
reduce to classical rules (e.g., Newton’s laws of motion) at cer-
tain scale limits, though those limits are unknown. According to
quantum physical laws:
• Objects/particles may exist in two or more places or states
simultaneously—more like waves than particles and governed
by a quantumwavefunction. This property of multiple coexist-
ing possibilities is known as quantum superposition.
• Multiple objects/particles can be unified, acting as a single
coherent object governed by one wavefunction. If a compo-
nent is perturbed, others feel it and react, e.g., in Bose-Einstein
condensation.
• If unified objects are spatially separated they remain unified.
This non-locality is also known as quantum entanglement.
But we don’t see quantum superpositions in our macroscale
world. How and why do quantum laws reduce to classical behav-
ior? Various interpretations of quantum mechanics address this
issue:
• Copenhagen and the conscious observer: In the early days of
quantum mechanics, Bohr (1934/1987) and colleagues recog-
nized that quantum superpositions persist until measured by a
device (the “Copenhagen interpretation”, after Bohr’s Danish
origin). Wigner (1961) and von Neumann (1932/1955) fur-
ther stipulated that the superposition continues in the device
until the results are observed by a conscious human, that con-
scious observation “collapses the wave function.” These inter-
pretations enabled quantum experiments to flourish, but put
consciousness outside science, and failed to account for fun-
damental reality. Schrödinger (1935) took exception, posing
his famous (“Schrödinger’s cat”) thought experiment in which
the fate of a cat in a box is tied to a quantum superposition,
reasoning that, according to the Wigner and von Neumann
interpretation, the cat would remain both dead and alive until
the box is opened and observed by a conscious human. Despite
the absurdity, limitations on quantum superposition remain
unknown.
• The multiple worlds view suggests each superposition is a sep-
aration in reality, evolving to a new universe (Everett, 1957).
There is no collapse, but an infinity of realities (and conscious
minds) is required.
• David Bohm’s interpretation (Bohm and Hiley, 1993) avoids
reduction/collapse by postulating another layer of reality.
Matter exists as objects guided by complex “pilot” waves of
possibility.
• Henry Stapp (1993) views the universe as a single quantum
wave function. Reduction within the brain is a conscious
moment (akin to Whitehead’s “occasion of experience”—
Whitehead, 1929, 1933). Reduction/collapse is consciousness,
but its cause and distinction between universal wave function
and that within the brain are unclear.
• In decoherence theory (e.g., Zurek, 2003) any interaction (loss
of isolation) of a quantum superposition with a classical system
(e.g., through heat, direct interaction or information exchange)
erodes the quantum system. But (1) the fate of isolated super-
positions is not addressed, (2) no quantum system is ever truly
isolated, (3) decoherence doesn’t actually disrupt superposi-
tion, just buries it in noise, and (4) some quantum processes
are enhanced by heat and/or noise.
• An objective threshold for quantum state reduction (OR) exists
due to e.g., the number of superpositioned particles (GRW
theory—Ghirardi et al., 1986) or a factor related to quantum
gravity or underlying properties of spacetime geometry, as in
the OR proposals of Károlyházy et al. (1986); Dic/si (1989) and
Penrose (1989, 1996). Penrose OR also includes consciousness,
each OR event being associated with a moment of conscious
experience.
Penrose (1989, 1994) uniquely brings consciousness into
physics, and directly approaches superpositioned objects as actual
separations in underlying reality at its most basic level (funda-
mental space-time geometry at the Planck scale of 10−33 cm).
Separation is akin to the multiple worlds view in which each pos-
sibility branches to form and evolve its own universe. However
according to Penrose the space-time separations are unstable and
(instead of branching off) spontaneously reduce (self-collapse)
to one particular space-time geometry or another. This OR self-
collapse occurs at a threshold given by E = h¯/t, where E is the
magnitude (gravitational self-energy) of the superposition, e.g.,
the number of tubulins (E is also proportional to intensity of con-
scious experience), h¯ is Planck’s constant (over 2π), and t the time
interval at which superposition Ewill self-reduce by OR, choosing
classical states in a moment of consciousness (Figure 10).
Penrose E = h¯/t is related to the Heisenberg “uncertainty
principle” which asserts a fundamental limit to the precision with
which values for certain pairs of physical properties can be simul-
taneously known. The most common examples are uncertainty
in position (x) and momentum (p) of a particle, given by their
standard deviations (σx and σp) whose product σxσp is the uncer-
tainty whichmustmeet or exceed a fundamental limit related to h¯,
Planck’s constant over 2π. The uncertainty principle is thus usu-
ally written as σxσp ≥ h¯/2. Uncertainty can pertain to properties
other than position and momentum, and Penrose equated super-
position/separation to uncertainty in the underlying structure of
space-time itself. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle imposes a
limit, causing quantum state reduction.
Space-time uncertainty is expressed as the gravitational self-
energy E, the energy required for an object of mass m and radius
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FIGURE 10 | Location or state of a particle/object is equivalent to
curvature in underlying spacetime geometry. From left, a superposition
develops over time, e.g., a particle separating from itself, shown as
simultaneous curvatures in opposite directions. The magnitude of the
separation is related to E, the gravitational self-energy. At a particular time t,
E reaches threshold by E = h¯/t, and spontaneous OR occurs, one
particular curvature is selected. This OR event is accompanied by a
moment of conscious experience (“NOW”), its intensity proportional to E.
Each OR event also results in temporal non-locality, referring quantum
information backward in classical time (curved arrows).
r (or it’s equivalent spacetime geometry) to separate from itself
by a distance a. For Orch OR, E was calculated for superposi-
tion/separation of tubulin proteins at three levels, with three sets
of m, r, and a. E was calculated for separation at the level of
(1) the entire tubulin protein, (2) atomic nuclei within tubulin,
and (3) nucleons (protons and neutrons) within tubulin atomic
nuclei. Separation at the level of atomic nuclei (femtometers) was
found to dominate, and used to calculate E (in terms of num-
ber of tubulins) for various values of time t corresponding with
neurophysiology, e.g., 25ms for gamma synchrony at 40Hz. For
a conscious event occurring at 25ms, superposition/separation
of 2 × 1010 tubulins are required, involving microtubules in
roughly tens of thousands of neurons (Hameroff and Penrose,
1996a).
Particular states are chosen in OR due to (1) algorithmic quan-
tum computing by the Schrödinger equation evolving toward
E = h¯/t, and (2) influence in the OR process at the moment
of E = h¯/t. According to Penrose, this influence, unlike ran-
domness associated with measurement and decoherence, reflects
“non-computable values” intrinsic to spacetime geometry. Thus
conscious choices in OR (and Orch OR) are neither random nor
algorithmically deterministic.
Quantum state reductions are essential to quantum comput-
ing which involves superposition of information states, e.g., both
1 and 0 (quantum bits, or “qubits”). Superpositioned qubits
entangle and compute (by the Schrödinger equation) until reduc-
tion/collapse of each qubit to classical values (“bits”) occurs as the
solution. In technological quantum computers, reduction occurs
by measurement/observation, introducing a component of ran-
domness. Superposition, entanglement and reduction are also
essential to quantum cryptography and quantum teleportation
technologies (Bennett and Wiesner, 1992; Bouwmeester et al.,
1997; Macikic et al., 2002). Entanglement implies non-locality,
e.g., that complementary quantum particles (electrons in coupled
spin-up and spin-down pairs) remain somehow connected when
spatially (or temporally) separated, each pair member reacting
instantaneously to perturbation of its separated partner. Einstein
initially objected to entanglement, as it would appear to require
signaling faster than light, and thus violate special relativity. He
famously termed it “spooky action at a distance,” and described
a thought experiment (“Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR)”;
Einstein et al., 1935) in which each member of an entangled
pair of superpositioned electrons (“EPR pairs”) would be sent in
different directions, each remaining in superposition and entan-
gled. When one electron was measured at its destination and,
say, spin-up was observed, its entangled twin miles away would,
according to the prediction, correspondingly reduce instanta-
neously to spin-down when measured. The issue was unresolved
at the time of Einstein’s death, but since the early 1980s (Aspect
et al., 1982; Tittel et al., 1998) this type of experiment has been
repeatedly confirmed through wires, fiber optic cables and via
microwave beams through atmosphere. Strange as it seems, EPR
entanglement is a fundamental feature of quantum mechanics
and reality. How can it be explained?
Penrose (1989; 2004, cf. Bennett and Wiesner, 1992) sug-
gested quantum entanglements are not mediated in a normal
causal way, that non-local entanglement (quantum information,
or “quanglement,” as Penrose terms it) should be thought of
as able to propagate in either direction in time (into the past
or into the future). Along similar lines, Aharonov and Vaidman
(1990) also proposed that quantum state reductions send quan-
tum information both forward and backward in what we per-
ceive as time, “temporal non-locality.” However it is generally
agreed that quantum information going backward in time can-
not, by itself, communicate or signal ordinary classical infor-
mation; it is “acausal.” This restriction is related to elimination
of possible causal paradox (e.g., signaling backward in time to
kill one’s ancestor, paradoxically preventing one’s birth). Indeed
quantum information going forward in time is also considered
acausal, unable to signal classical information either. In quan-
tum cryptography and teleportation, acausal quantum informa-
tion can only influence or correlate with classical information,
but nonetheless greatly enhance capabilities of causal, classical
processes.
Penrose suggested acausal backward time effects used in con-
junction with classical channels could influence classical results
in a way unattainable by classical, future-directed means alone,
and that temporal non-locality and acausal backward time
effects were essential features of entanglement. He suggested that
in EPR (Figure 11), quantum information/quanglement from
the measurement/state reduction moves backward in (what we
“naively” perceive as classical) time to the unified pair, then to
the complementary twin, influencing and correlating its state
when measured. Can quantum backward referral happen in the
brain?
ORCHESTRATED OBJECTIVE REDUCTION (Orch OR)
Penrose put forth OR as a mechanism for consciousness in physi-
cal science (the first, and still only specific proposal). For neurobi-
ological implementation of OR, the Penrose–Hameroff model of
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FIGURE 11 | Backward time in EPR entanglement. The
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment verified by Aspect et al. (1982);
Tittel et al. (1998), and many others. On the left is an isolated, entangled
pair of superpositioned complementary quantum particles, e.g., two
electrons in spin up and spin down states. The pair is separated and sent to
two different, spatially-separated locations/measuring devices. The single
electron at the top (in superposition of both spin up and spin down states)
is measured, and reduces to a single classical state (e.g., spin down).
Instantaneously its spatially-separated twin reduces to the complementary
state of spin up (or vice versa). The effect is instantaneous over significant
distance, hence appears to be transmitted faster than the speed of light.
According to Penrose (2004; cf. Bennett and Wiesner, 1992),
measurement/reduction of the electron at the top sends quantum
information backward in time to the origin of the unified entanglement,
then onward to the twin electron. No other reasonable explanation has
been put forth.
“Orch OR” proposed quantum computations terminated by OR
in microtubules within brain neurons, “orchestrated” by synaptic
inputs, memory and other factors, hence “Orch OR” (Penrose and
Hameroff, 1995, 2011; Hameroff and Penrose, 1996a,b;Hameroff,
1998, 2007). Starting with classical microtubule automata (e.g.,
Rasmussen et al., 1990) in which tubulins in microtubule lattices
convey interactive bit states, e.g., of 1 or 0, and are thus capa-
ble of classical information processing (Figure 5B), Orch OR also
proposed that quantum superpositioned tubulin bits, or “qubits,”
e.g., of both 1 AND 0 compute via entanglement with tubulins in
the same neuron, and also those in neighboring and distant neu-
rons via gap junctions (Figure 12). The quantum computations
evolve by the Schrödinger equation in entangled microtubules
in dendrites and cell bodies during integration phases of gap
junction-connected integrate-and-fire neurons. Entangled super-
positions contribute to increasing gravitational self-energy E.
When threshold is met by E = h¯/t, a conscious moment occurs
as entangled tubulin qubits simultaneously undergo OR to clas-
sical tubulin states which then proceed to trigger (or not trigger)
axonal firings, and adjust synapses. Microtubule quantum com-
putations can thus be the “x-factor” in integration regulating
axonal firing threshold. Compatible with known neurophysi-
ology, Orch OR can account for conscious causal control of
behavior.
Entangled superpositions leading to OR and moments of
consciousness by E = h¯/t are seen as sequential, only one “con-
sciousness” occurring in the brain at any one time (except perhaps
for “split-brain” patients, or those with other cognitive disorders).
FIGURE 12 | Three toy neurons in an input/integration layer.
Adjacent dendrites are connected by gap junction electrical synapses in
“dendritic web,” showing internal cytoskeletal microtubules connected
by microtubule-associated proteins. Insert: communication/correlation
between microtubules through gap junctions by electromagnetic or
quantum entanglement, enabling collective integration among gap
junction-connected, synchronized neurons and glia.
Superpositions outside the largest, most rapidly evolving gap
junction-connected web may decohere randomly, or continue
and participate in a subsequent moment of consciousness. The
results of each Orch OR conscious moment set initial conditions
for the next.
By E = h¯/t, superposition of about 2 × 1010 tubulins would
reach threshold at t = 25ms, as in 40Hz gamma synchrony, 40
conscious moments/s. Depending on the percentage of tubulins
involved per neuron, this would entail thousands to hundreds
of thousands of gap junction-connected neurons per conscious
moment at 40Hz as the NCC (Figure 12). With specific neuronal
distributions and brain regions defined by gap junction openings
and closings, synchronized “dendritic webs” as the NCC canmove
and redistribute moment to moment. Within the NCC, con-
sciousness by E = h¯/t may occur on a spectrum of frequencies, at
different fractal-like scales of brain activity (He et al., 2010), with
deeper order, finer scale entangled processes in microtubules cor-
relating with high frequency, high intensity experience, and larger
proportions of brain involvement.
Proteins can act as quantum levers, able to amplify quantum
effects into particular classical states (Conrad, 1994). Orch OR
suggests that tubulin states and superpositions are initiated by
electron cloud dipoles (van der Waals London forces) in clus-
ters of aromatic resonance rings (e.g., in amino acids tryptophan,
phenylalanine, tyrosine, Figures 13A–C). London force dipoles
are inherently quantum mechanical, tending to superposition.
They also mediate effects of general anesthetic gases which act in
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FIGURE 13 | (A) A microtubule, a cylindrical lattice of peanut-shaped tubulin
proteins, with molecular model of enlarged single tubulin with C-termini
tails (Craddock et al., 2012c). (B) Tubulin dimer, lower C terminus tail visible.
Interior blowup shows aromatic rings clustered in a linear groove, and
further blowup of ring structures. (C) Approximate locations of resonance
rings suggesting trans-tubulin alignments (see Figure 14A).
aromatic clusters (“hydrophobic pockets”) in neuronal proteins
including tubulin to selectively erase consciousness (Hameroff,
2006). This suggests a deeper order, finer scale component of the
NCC.
Electron movements of one nanometer, e.g., in a London force
dipole oscillation, displace atomic nuclei by one Fermi length,
10−15 m, the diameter of a carbon atom nucleus (Sataric et al.,
1998), and also the superposition separation distance required for
gravitational self-energy E in Orch OR (Hameroff and Penrose,
1996a,b). Thus London forces can induce superposition of an
entire protein/tubulinmass, albeit by an extremely tiny separation
distance. Nonetheless the protein-level (rather than electron only)
superposition separation engenders significant gravitational self-
energy E, and thus by E = h¯/t, usefully brief durations of time t
for conscious moments and actions.
Orch OR has been criticized on the basis of decoherence in
the “warm, wet and noisy” brain, preventing superposition long
enough to reach threshold (Tegmark, 2000; cf. Hagan et al.,
2001). But subsequently plant proteins have been shown to rou-
tinely use electron superposition for chemical energy (Engel
et al., 2007). Further research has demonstrated warm quan-
tum effects in bird brain navigation (Gauger et al., 2011), ion
channels (Bernroider and Roy, 2005), sense of smell (Turin,
1996), DNA (Rieper et al., 2011), protein folding (Luo and Lu,
2011), and biological water (Reiter et al., 2011). Microtubules
(Sahu et al., 2012) appear to have kilohertz and megahertz res-
onance related to enhanced (?quantum) conductance through
spiral pathways.
Conductance pathways through aromatic ring arrays in each
tubulin aligned with neighbor tubulin arrays following spi-
ral geometry in microtubule lattices (Figure 14A) allow heli-
cal macroscopic “quantum highways” through microtubules
(Figure 14A) suitable for topological quantum computing
(Kitaev, 1997; Hameroff et al., 2002; Penrose and Hameroff,
2011). With particular spiral pathways as topological qubits
(“braids”) rather than individual tubulins, overall microtubule
information capacity is reduced, each topological bit/qubit
FIGURE 14 | (A) Alignment of aromatic ring structures in tubulins and
through microtubule lattice suggests different helical pathways, possible
macroscopic “quantum highways” e.g., following the Fibonacci sequence
in the A lattice. (B) Top: superpositioned tubulins (gray) increase through
first three steps (neuronal integration) until threshold is met by E = h¯/t,
resulting in Orch OR, a conscious moment, and selection of classical
tubulin states which may trigger axonal firing. (B) Bottom: same as (A),
but with topological qubits, i.e., different helical pathways represent
information. One particular pathway is selected in the Orch OR conscious
moment.
FIGURE 15 | Two Orch OR events (solid lines) underlie
integrate-and-fire electrophysiology (dotted lines) in neurons. Orch OR
and conscious moments occur here at t = 25ms (gamma synchrony), with
E then equivalent to superposition of approximately 2 × 1010 tubulins. Each
Orch OR moment occurs with conscious experience, and selects tubulin
states which can then trigger axonal firings. Each Orch OR event can also
send quantum information backward in perceived time.
pathway requiring many tubulins (Figure 14B, Bottom). But
topological qubits are robust, resist decoherence, and reduce
to classical helical pathways (or combinations) which can, with
each conscious moment, regulate synapses and trigger axonal
firings.
In Figure 15, two Orch OR conscious moments underlie
gamma synchrony electrophysiology in an integrate-and-fire
neuron. Quantum superposition E evolves during integra-
tion, increasing with time until threshold is met at E = h¯/t
(t = 25ms),atwhichinstantanOrchORconsciousmomentoccurs
(intensity proportional to E), and classical states of tubulin are
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selected which can trigger (or not trigger) axonal firings which
control actions and behavior (as well as regulate synaptic strength
and record memory).
Each Orch OR quantum state reduction also causes tem-
poral non-locality, sending quantum information/quanglement
(with gravitational self-energy E) backward in what we per-
ceive as classical time, integrating with forward-going E
to help reach E = h¯/t, perhaps earlier than would other-
wise occur (Figure 2B). As described previously, Orch OR
temporal non-locality and backward time referral of quan-
tum information can provide real-time conscious causal con-
trol of voluntary actions (Figure 6; cf. Wolf, 1998; Sarfatti,
2011).
Do backward time effects risk causal paradox? In classical
physics, the cause of an effect must precede it. But backward-
going quanglement is acausal, only able to influence or corre-
late with information in a classical channel, e.g., as occurs in
quantum entanglement, cryptography and teleportation. And
according to some quantum interpretations, backward time
effects can’t violate causality if they only alter past events whose
subsequent effects had not been consciously observed (“If a
tree falls . . . .”). In the experimental studies cited here (Libet,
pre-sentiment/Bem, delayed choice) backward referral itself is
non-conscious (though Libet refers to it as “subjective experi-
ence”) until reduction occurs in the present. There is no causal
paradox.
If conscious experience is indeed rooted in Orch OR, with OR
relating the classical to the quantum world, then temporal non-
locality and referral of acausal quantum information backward in
time is to be expected (Penrose and Hameroff, 2011). Temporal
non-locality and backward time referral can rescue causal agency
and conscious free will.
CONCLUSION: HOW QUANTUM BRAIN BIOLOGY CAN
RESCUE CONSCIOUS FREE WILL
Problems regarding conscious “free will” include: (1) the need for
a neurobiological mechanism to account for consciousness and
causal agency, (2) conscious perceptions apparently occurring
too late for real-time conscious responses, and (3) determinism.
Penrose–Hameroff “Orch OR” is a theory in which moments
of conscious choice and experience are identified with quan-
tum state reductions in microtubules inside neurons. Orch OR
can help resolve the three problematic issues in the following
ways.
A MECHANISM FOR CONSCIOUSNESS AND CAUSAL AGENCY
Orch OR is based on sequences of quantum computations in
microtubules during integration phases in dendrites and cell bod-
ies of integrate-and-fire brain neurons linked by gap junctions.
Each Orch OR quantum computation terminates in a moment of
conscious experience, and selects a particular set of tubulin states
which then trigger (or do not trigger) axonal firings, the latter
exerting causal behavior. Orch OR can in principle account for
conscious causal agency.
DOES CONSCIOUSNESS COME TOO LATE?
Brain electrical activity appearing to correlate with conscious
perception of a stimulus can occur after we respond to that
stimulus, seemingly consciously. Accordingly, consciousness is
deemed epiphenomenal and illusory (Dennett, 1991; Wegner,
2002). However evidence for backward time effects in the brain
(Libet et al., 1983; Bem, 2012; Ma et al., 2012), and in quan-
tum physics (e.g., to explain entanglement, Penrose, 1989, 2004;
Aharonov and Vaidman, 1990; Bennett and Wiesner, 1992) sug-
gest that quantum state reductions in Orch OR can send quantum
information backward in (what we perceive as) time, on the order
of hundreds of milliseconds. This enables consciousness to reg-
ulate axonal firings and behavioral actions in real-time, when
conscious choice is felt to occur (and actually does occur), thus
rescuing consciousness from necessarily being an epiphenomenal
illusion.
DETERMINISM
Is the universe unfolding (in which case free will is possible), or
does it exist as a “block universe” with pre-determined world-
lines, our actions pre-determined by algorithmic processes? In
Orch OR, consciousness unfolds the universe. The selection of
states, according to Penrose, is influenced by a non-computable
factor, a bias due to fine scale structure of spacetime geome-
try. According to Orch OR, conscious choices are not entirely
algorithmic.
Orch OR is a testable quantum brain biological theory com-
patible with known neuroscience and physics, and able to account
for conscious free will.
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